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Abstract
An attacker who has gained access to a computer
may want to upload or modify configuration files,
etc., and run arbitrary programs of his choice. We
can severely restrict the power of the attacker by
having a white-list of approved file checksums and
preventing the kernel from loading loading any file
with a bad checksum. The check may be placed in
the kernel, but that requires a kernel that is pre-
pared for it. The check may also be placed in a
hypervisor which intercepts and prevents the ker-
nel from loading a bad file.
We describe the implementation of and give per-
formance results for two systems. In one the check-
summing, or integrity measurement, and decision
is performed by the hypervisor instead of the OS.
In the other only the final integrity decision is done
in the hypervisor. By moving the integrity check
out from the VM kernel it becomes harder for the
intruder to bypass the check.
We conclude that it is technically possible to put
file integrity control into the hypervisor, both for
kernels without and with pre-compiled support for
integrity measurement.
1 Introduction
The task of building completely secure system has
made significant strides as we have seen first cor-
rectness proofs for an OS kernel, for c compilers,
and for the gate level implementation of multicore
CPUs. However, even if the kernel is correct, there
will likely always be bugs in application programs,
as they are more diverse, modified much more fre-
quently, and generally built by fewer developers, or
built by composing code from different sources (li-
braries, etc.). Thus, even if the OS kernel is correct,
there may still be be opportunities for intruders to
take control of a computer via the application pro-
grams that run on it. This paper is concerned with
how to limit the abilities of an attacker who has
broken in to a computer.
The approach taken here is to prevent an at-
tacker who has broken into a computer via an ap-
plication program from executing arbitrary pro-
grams.1 To do that, the computer owner can in
advance create a list with checksums for each file
that the kernel is allowed to load, and then use some
mechanism that prevents the kernel from loading
the file if the checksum does not match. While
this mechanism does not prevent the attacker from
(mis)using existing programs, the mechanism may,
if properly deployed, severely limit the amount of
control an attacker can gain over the computer.
A mechanism that prevents loading of unap-
proved files has recently made its way into the
Linux kernel in the form of IMA, the Linux In-
tegrity Measurement Architecture. IMA hooks into
the mmap system call inside the kernel and com-
putes the checksum of the entire file just when it
is about to be memory mapped. If so configured,
IMA forces mmap to fail if the checksum is not cor-
rect, and thus prevents a user process to access files
with incorrect checksums.
IMA is built into the kernel and executes inside
the kernel and therefore only works in kernels who
have been prepared with IMA from the beginning.
In a hosted virtualized environment, such as in a
cloud computing infrastructure, it may also be de-
sirable to be able to run arbitrary kernels of the
customer’s choice, while at the same time be able
1In general an attacker has many more options to gain
more control, including using the programs that are already
available. However, not being able to run scripts, etc.,
severely limits any automated attack.
1
to protect against intrusion in the customers’ VMs.
Another security complication is that the in-
tegrity of the checksum list must be protected by
the kernel. If the list is kept in the kernel it may be
authenticated with a digital signature. However,
the public key used to verify the list’s authenticity
must be protected, and it may therefore be desir-
able to move the key out from the VM and into the
hypervisor.
We have therefore developed two prototypes to
test different ways to provide hypervisor support
for file checksumming and policing (or integrity
measurements, in IMA words).
The first prototype is a hypervisor that is able to
prevent a guest kernel from loading bad/tampered
files by, just as IMA does, intercepting the guest
VM execution near the end of mmap, compute the
checksum and make the mmap call fail if the check-
sum is incorrect. But, differently from IMA, it does
not require any checksumming code inside the ker-
nel. The entire checksum computation is moved
into the hypervisor.
The second prototype relies on the kernel to com-
pute the checksum with IMA, and just checks the
integrity of the value in the white-list by verifying
the white-list signature with a public key kept in
the hypervisor.
The next section describes the implementation of
the two approaches. Section 3 reports the results
of the performance measurements. In section 4 we
discuss the conclusions that can be drawn from the
observation. In section 5 we discuss related work
which this work is based on, or which addresses
a similar problem, and the paper conclusions are
given in section 6.
2 Hypervisor Measurement
Implementation
2.1 Approach 1: Hypervisor Check-
summing
2.1.1 Design
One problem with moving the checksumming out
from the kernel is the question of how the hyper-
visor can get hold of the content in files inside the
VM. The hypervisor can’t simply read the file con-
tents from the VM’s disk. A kernel can manage a
large number of different file systems, files can be
encrypted on disk or retrieved over the network. It
is therefore not sufficient for the VMM to simply
bypass the VM and read the file contents from the
guest’s disk before the guest kernel is allowed to
proceed.
Our approach is to let the hypervisor intercept
and divert the guest kernel’s execution just before
it is about to return from mmap. Then the hyper-
visor retrieves the file by tricking the kernel into
loading the file contents. The hypervisor injects
several function calls into the kernel by modifying
the VMs program counter (EIP) and registers of
the kernel thread that requests the mmap.
VM
Whitelist
mmap
...
kernel_load
...
while not EOF
    x=inject syscall
    c=checksum(c,x)
r = match(c,whitelist)
set_return_val(r)
VM
Whitelist+sign
mmap
c=ima_checksum
kernel_load
...
r = c in whitelist 
 && checksign...
  ...(whitelist, pubkey)
set_return_val(r)
pubkey
...
Figure 1: In the first approach, the hypervisor com-
putes the checksum.
First the hypervisor makes he thread call kmal-
loc to reserves one page of memory inside the ker-
nel’s address space. This page is mapped into the
hypervisor’s memory so the hypervisor can have
quick access to the page contents.
Next the hypervisor retrieves the file contents by
repeatedly injecting calls to kernel read to load the
file, one page at a time, see fig.1. For each page that
is retrieved, the hypervisor updates the file check-
sum. Finally it calls kfree to release the memory
page, adjusts mmap’s return value in register EAX
as desired, and restores the EIP to continue the
execution as normal.
Our approach requires that the hypervisor is
aware of which addresses to intercept, and it also
needs information about some of the kernel data
structures, in particular the offsets to the fields in
the structs.
The required kernel symbols and data structures
2
are listed in table 2.1.1. This information can be
obtained from the kernel symbol file and header
files. (Hackers have other methods for finding the
kernel layout and data structures in an unknown
kernel. ( See section 5 - How to gather offsets &
symbol addresses, in Smashing The Kernel Stack
For Fun And Profit, by Sinan ‘noir’ Eren, Phrack,
Volume 0x0b, Issue 0x3c, Phile #0x06 of 0x10,
http://www.phrack.com/issues.html?issue=60&id=6#article
)
Kernel symbol
process measurement
kernel read
kfree
security file mmap
kmem cache alloc trace
kmalloc caches
destroy inode
integrity inode free
Data structure
struct file
struct path
struct dentry
struct inode
struct super block
Table 1: Kernel symbols and data structures
needed by the hypervisor
Invoking kernel calls is not side effect free, and
thus not completely invisible to the kernel. Just as
with IMA, when mmap has finished, the kernel will
have loaded the contents of the entire file. This has
two effects, the first one being that the initial call
to mmap is much slower (since it has to read the
entire file), and the second one is that subsequents
calls to read are faster, since some of the blocks will
be in the page cache.
In Linux without IMA, memory-mapping a file
does not load any of the files content. It just installs
a handler that detects when the user process tries to
read from the file and then loads only the requested
pages (by trapping memory page faults). Thus, if
only some bytes in the middle of the file are read,
only the corresponding block will be loaded from
disk.
IMA keeps one checksum for the entire file. This
means that when the file is mapped, the entire file
needs to be read in for the checksum to be com-
puted. This makes mapping large files slow, and is
a substantial way to how Linux currently works.
One can imagine other approaches to checksum-
ming the files, such as having separate checksums
for different parts of the file (such as one per
disk block, or one per megabyte). These check-
sums could be checked when the blocks are actu-
ally loaded into memory. Then it would not be
mmap that fails if the file has a bad checksum. In-
stead the program would get a memory protection
error later, when the virtual memory system has
triggered loading a corrupted part of the file.
While the late check is faster, it has its draw-
backs. Failing in the middle of an execution may
enable situations where an attacker may cause a
program to start because the first blocks are un-
modified, and then fail later upon accessing a mod-
ified part of the file. This may leave the system
in an inconsistent state, which may potentially be
exploited for attacks.
2.1.2 Implementation
In our implementation we are using a hypervisor
which is a modified version of the Bochs x86 emu-
lator. The original Bochs emulator is implemented
in C++. Each CPU instruction is implemented as
an ”instruction function,” individual method invo-
cations on a CPU object. We have modified the
implementation in two ways.
First we have moved out the CPU instructions
into a separate file which is compiled into LLVM
bit code, for two reasons. One is that the LLVM is
a compiler toolkit with an intermediate code repre-
sentation that is very good for doing optimization
passes. We anticipate to be able to speed up exe-
cution by optimizing together the sequences of in-
structions in a basic block. The other reason is that
we can add very efficient probes into the instruction
functions. A test that would usually require the use
of an MMU or CPU debug functionality may be in-
lined as regular instructions into the native code,
or even eliminated completely. The optimization
work is not done yet, so the LLVM step still incurs
some additional overhead.
The second way we have modified Bochs is to
add the integrity mechanism. It adds a test in the
CPU instruction loop to see if the EIP (Instruction
Pointer) has reached the address that we want to
intercept. This check is inefficient and costly, and
of the kind that we expect to be able to mostly
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optimize away with the technique outlined above.
If we have reached the monitored address, we cre-
ate a context record in the hypervisor’s memory
that stores the kernel thread’s current CPU state,
including registers, stack pointer and an intercept
mode state.
By looking at the contents of the register and
traversing the Guest’s memory, we can retrieve in-
formation from the kernel data structures, such as
file pointers, filename, mode bits, file size, etc. If
the file should be checksummed according to the
policy, we perform a binary search in a list of previ-
ously computed hashes to see if the file was already
checked. If not, we start the process of checksum-
ming the file.
To checksum a file, we have to go through three
modes - allocate - read - free. The kernel thread’s
current mode is stored in the intercept mode state
field in the context record above. If the kernel
thread is new, we set it to ’allocate’ mode, modify
the CPU registers to prepare for a call to kmalloc
to allocate one page of kernel memory, and resume
computation.
When the CPU returns to the intercepted ad-
dress, it could either be because kmalloc has re-
turned, or due to another thread calling mmap. We
distinguish threads by looking at the value of the
stack pointer.
When a thread has returned to the intercepted
address from kmalloc, i.e. when it is in the ’allo-
cate’ mode, we set the thread’s mode to ’read’. We
prepare a sha1 context in the hypervisor memory,
and set the CPU registers to call kernel read, to
read the first 4k bytes from the file into the guest
memory page that we previously kmalloc:ed, and
resume execution. When the same thread eventu-
ally returns and is in read state, we update the sha1
checksum, and if there are more bytes to read, we
repeat the call to kernel read for the next 4k bytes,
and so on.
When we have reached the end of the file, we set
the thread’s mode to ’free’. We set the CPU regis-
ters to call kfree to free the kernel memory page we
allocated earlier, and resume execution. When the
thread again reaches the intercepted address and
is in free state, we restore the CPU registers from
the context record, which is then invalidated, store
the computed checksum in the checksum cache, and
output it to a log, before we resume the thread’s
computation.
2.2 Approach 2: Hypervisor Ap-
proves Kernel-Computed Check-
sums
2.2.1 Design
The other approach to hypervisor integrity mea-
surement consists of using the hypervisor’s ability
to set break points in the guest VM. In this ap-
proach, we have used the Xen hypervisor and the
gdbsx functionality which enables the use of gdb to
place breakpoints in the guest VM. In dom0, the de-
bugger, gdb connects to gdbsx which is only avail-
ble to the priviledged domain, dom0. The mea-
sured domain’s memory is made available to dom0
by Xen’s ability to map memory pages into multiple
domains.
In this approach we have used gdb’s scripting
capability to run the guest and execute a python
script when a break point is hit. The break point
is placed precisely when the IMA code in the guest
kernel is computed. Control is passed back to the
gdb in dom0 who checks that the signature is on
the approved list, and then resumes execution of
the guest.
As for the first approach, placing the break point
requires knowledge of some addresses in the guest
kernel, but fewer, since the guest execution is never
diverted, only suspended. However, in approach
2 we require that the kernel is already compiled
with IMA, and the hypervisor only checks that the
resulting checksum is indeed a ’trusted’ checksum,
see fig.2.
VM
Whitelist
mmap
...
kernel_lo d
...
while not EOF
    x=inject syscall
    c=checksum(c,x)
r = match(c,whitelist)
set_return_val(r)
VM
Whitelist+sign
mmap
c=ima_checksum
kernel_load
...
r = c in whitelist 
 && checksign...
  ...(whitelist, pubkey)
set_return_val(r)
pubkey
...
Figure 2: In the second approach, the kernel com-
putes the checksum, and the hypervisor verifies
that the whitelist is genuine.
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To improve the security attributes of the system,
the VMI application possesses only the public key,
and does not have the private key. The private
key is only used to sign each file on filesystem on a
trusted machine when preparing the guest VM im-
age. This has impact on the system design. While
only the public key is needed for signature verifica-
tion, the private key is used for signing. Essentially
whenever a file is modified its signature has to be
updated as well. The set of files the security func-
tion will check depends on the security policy and
can be configured. Therefore it could be the case
that verification only happens for important files,
for instance files owned by root, which are expected
to be immutable.
2.2.2 Implementation
Kernel debugging is the method used for virtual
machine introspection, VMI, in approach 2, and
it is already incorporated in the Xen VMM. A
python script connects to gdbsx, the gdb server im-
plemented in Xen, and performs the security func-
tion. gdbsx provides the functionality for the se-
curity function to insert breakpoints at arbitrary
addresses in guest VM’s memory. Whenever CPU
hits a breakpoint in the guest VM, it generates
a breakpoint exception interrupt. Xen hypervisor
controls this interrupt. Xen pauses the guest VM,
and gives control to dom0 which in turn generates
a SIGTRAP signal. This signal is handled by gdb,
which triggers our python script. Using VMI, the
python script in dom0 is notified whenever a file
is accessed in the target DomU which verifies the
file’s signature by the proper public key.
To bridge the semantic gap, some initial informa-
tion is provided to gdb. To allow gdb to access vari-
ables and structures in the guest VM kernel space,
gdb needs to access the compiled directory of the
kernel. This allows gdb to know about exact struc-
ture of the kernel. Also, the unzipped version of
the kernel file has to be available to the gdb. This
file contains symbol information of the kernel, and
matches information in the system.map file.
To enforce internally denying file access, either
a new module has to be installed or an available
mechanism in the Linux kernel has to be used. Here
we take advantage of the IMA-Appraisal mecha-
nism in the kernel. IMA-Appraisal stores the 160-
bit SHA1 digest of files in the extended attribute of
a file, ”security.ima”. In contrast to storing good
digest values centrally in a database, saving good
SHA1 digests in the file inode removes the search
delay. IMA-Appraisal stores valid crypto values in
files extended attributes to be enforced internally
in a VM. In addition, IMA implements an internal
cache which improves the performance.
To handle the problem about updating files’ sig-
nature, one more security function is designed. The
second security function uses only a secret key to
verify the HMAC-SHA1 digest of files. HMAC-
SHA1 is chosen since this crypto function generates
a 160-bit digest, and IMA uses 160-bit SHA1 digest
as well. Since these two crypto functions generate
160-bit digests, no kernel modification is required,
while in the RSA signature verification, the Linux
kernel should be modified to be able to work with
4096-bit RSA signatures. Below the RSA verifica-
tion design is named VMI-RSA and the HMAC-
SHA1 validation design is named VMI-HMAC re-
spectively.
VMI-HMAC is a low-rate context switching se-
curity function which validates the HMAC-SHA1
digests of files, in a guest VM as they are loaded in
memory. The security function runs in dom0, and
uses a secret key. VMI-RSA is a low-rate context
switching security function which verifies the RSA
signature of files when they are loaded in the mem-
ory of a guest VM. Verification occurs using the
proper public key in dom0. To enhance the secu-
rity attributes, dom0 and the security function do
not possess the private key used for initial signing.
The IMA-Appraisal extended attribute, ”secu-
rity.ima”, is 160 bits, while the RSA signature is
4096 bits. For this reason it was decided to design
and implement the VMI-HMAC security function
that uses the original 160-bit, and does not change
the length of security.ima. In this model, VMI in
Dom0 possesses a secret key and using that key,
it verifies the integrity of files and updates their
extended attributes.
IMA uses the ima calc hash function for cal-
culating the SHA1 digests. This function is
only called by ima collect measurement. To ver-
ify the integrity of files VMI-HMAC intercepts
ima calc hash function flow. It is possible to
replace the calculated SHA1 digest by insert-
ing a breakpoint in either where ima calc hash
returns or where it is called. We chose to
put it in ima collect measurement, which calls
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ima calc hash.
By inserting a breakpoint after where the
ima calc hash function is called, it is possible to
replace the file hash digest, stored in iint − >
ima xattr.digest with the HMAC-SHA1 digest.
The HMAC-SHA1 digest is computed by the VMI
application with the secret key. When CPU ex-
ecutes a breakpoint it gives control to the break-
points handler which is gdb/gdbsx, and then fi-
nally a python script is executed, which first reads
the SHA1 digest computed by IMA via iint − >
ima xattr.digest. Next it computes HMAC value
based on the secret key and the SHA1 digest, and
finally it replaces the SHA1 digest with the newly
computed HMAC-SHA1 digest.
For VMI-RSA we needed to mod-
ify IMA DIGEST SIZE in ima.h and
evm ima xattr data.digest in integrity.h to
hold 4096 bits. These changes do not affect IMA
normal behavior since all variable and structure
fields are initialized with 0. Since VMI-RSA
does not have access to the private key it cannot
update file checksums. But since it has the
public key, it can verify the RSA signature stored
in extended security attributes, by intercepting
ima appraise measurement just after it has com-
pared the checksum with the value stored in the
security.ima attribute. IMA simply performs
a byte-by-byte comparison with the security
attribute. VMI-RSA on the other hand will copy
over checksum and the 512 bytes of the security
attribute into dom0 and verify that it contains
a valid signature for the checksum. VMI-RSA
then overwrites the return value of the IMA’s
byte-by-byte comparison to instead report success
if and only if the signature was valid.
3 Results
3.1 Approach 1: Hypervisor Check-
summing
Here we report on the experiments that were made
to study the overhead caused by the hypervisor in-
tegrity measurements.
Since the experimental setup is quite complex
with layers of software executing on top of others,
we performed experiments to first determine how
much each layer added to the total execution time.
This allows us to finally determine the cost of the
integrity measurements themselves.
In the experiment we test the effect of our mod-
ifications to the task of memory mapping a single
block of medium sized and large file. The effect
that is expected is that without integrity measure-
ments, the execution time is very quick, even if the
files are large, but with integrity measurements, ei-
ther by IMA, the hypervisor, or both, the execution
time should be considerably longer for the first ac-
cess of the file. Later accesses to the file should be
faster since the checksums are only computed the
first time the file is accessed.
The test machine is a Dell R200, quad-core Intel
Xeon X3360, 2.83GHz with 4 GiB memory, running
Ubuntu 10.04 with Linux kernel 2.6.32. The guest
VM gets 1 GiB of RAM.
In the first experiment we first read one block
from five files of size 100 MiB and report the ex-
ecution time. Then we repeat that experiment 99
times and report the total execution time.
In the second experiment we first read one block
from 20 files of size 1 MiB and report the execution
time. Then we repeat that experiment 99 times
and report the total execution time.
Each of the experiment was repeated three times
for each system configuration. The OS in the VM
was rebooted between each run to clean the VM
page caches.
Four systems were investigated: chroot with the
loopback mounted file system, Linux kvm, a regular
Bochs without any modifications, a Bochs with the
LLVM JIT-compiled byte code, and a Bochs with
the LLVM JIT-compiled byte code that performs
integrity measurements of the guest VM.
Each of the four systems were run with Linux
IMA either off or on, except for chroot which was
only run with IMA off, because IMA support was
lacking in the host kernel.
The time measurements are not very accurate for
low values. This is because the VM guest clocks
drifted very much, and we synchronized the local
clock with NTP before measuring the start and stop
time. This incurred an additive cost of about two
seconds, with some second of variance due to net-
work traffic. This is unimportant for understand-
ing the qualitative results of our experiments, and
more precision in these measurements will not add
to the understanding of the integrity measurement
system we report here.
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The results are shown in table 2.
3.2 Approach 2: Hypervisor Ap-
proves Kernel-Computed Check-
sums
Here we report on the experiments that were made
to study the overhead caused by the hypervisor ap-
proving but not computing the file checksums. The
values are in table 3.
To determine the sources of execution overhead
for approach 2 we run a set of experiments, simi-
larly to approach 1. We vary the number of files
and file sizes, and in each case we read just the first
10 KiB of each file in the set using dd. The experi-
ment is run with or without IMA without any vir-
tualization (”bare metal”), in Xen dom0 with direct
device access, in domU with indirect device access.
Finally we run the VMI-HMAC and VMI-RSA, and
a dummy VMI that does nothing but trapping to
dom0 and return. The latter is used to estimate the
cost of the trapping. As for the approach 1 exper-
iments we use ntp to synchronize the clocks before
and after each round of the experiment to mitigate
clock drift.
The tests are run on an Intel Core i7-2829QM
2.30GHz processor, with Intel VT, 16GB RAM,
and 7200 RPM iSCSI disk. The DomU has 12GB
RAM. Fedora 16, 64-bit, is used as OS for all sys-
tem configurations. The Linux kernel is 3.2.0-rc1
with the IMA-Appraisal patches.
4 Discussion
4.1 Approach 1: Hypervisor Check-
summing
Comparing the execution times of the tests in a ch-
rooted environment and a kvm without IMA, we
see as expected that they are about as big for the
first access. The only significant cost here is the
cost of the ntpd synchronization which is performed
before and after each synchronization, and it takes
approximately (3+3+2)/3 = 2.7 seconds. After re-
moving the time for ntp synchronization removed
from the next access times and divide by 500, we
can see that each of the next 99 access to the 5
large files takes about 1 ms each for chroot, and
also 1 ms for the 20 small files. Kvm takes 4 ms
per file for the large files and 3 ms per file for the
small files.
The third line in table 2 shows that running a
kernel with IMA enabled in kvm significantly in-
creases execution time in particular for the first ac-
cess to the file. Subsequent accesses are not signif-
icantly affected. In the first access, we read 5*100
MiB, so the cost is 23 ms per MiB for the large
files. For the small files the same cost would add
0.5 seconds to the values, which is within the mea-
surement error.
The fourth line shows the results of running in
an unmodified bochs emulator. In the experiments
the clock inside the emulator drifted a lot, which is
what forced us to use ntp to set the clocks. This
means that the errors are larger for the bochs mea-
surements. For instance, the measurement scripts
reported about one second for the first accesses to
both large and small files. Since the clocks are syn-
chronized with ntp before and after the experiment
the error due to drift is additive rather than multi-
plicative. Each file access takes around 45 ms and
35 ms for the large and small files respectively in
the experiment. The difference may be partially ex-
plained as a measurement error, due to a 3 second
clock drift per measurement.
Comparing line 4 (c++ bochs) and line 2 (kvm),
we see that c++ bochs is about five to seven times
slower than kvm for our workload. Comparing line
4 (c++ bochs) and 6 (llvm-bochs), and comparing
line 5 (c++ bochs IMA) with line 7 (llvm-bochs
IMA) we see that the llvm-bochs is about 20-25
percent slower than c++ bochs in all cases.
The overhead of running IMA can be seen in line
5. The initial access is very slow since IMA has
to load and compute the checksum of the entire
file. The cost is 1.34 seconds per MB for the large
files and only 0.12 seconds for the small files. The
difference may be due to the the host OS being able
to cache the small files, implying that with bochs, a
cache miss in the host incurs a ten-fold increase in
loading and checksumming. The next 99 accesses
are faster than their non-IMA counterparts. This
can be explained by recalling that IMA has placed
the file content in the guest OS’s page cache, and
thus do not have to retrieve it from the host OS.
We are now in the position of assessing the over-
head of putting the integrity check into the hyper-
visor. Line 8 shows that the hypervisor integrity
file is much faster (47 and 3 seconds for large and
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Hypervisor Integrity 5 files 100 MiB 20 files 1 MiB
check First Next 99 First Next 99
access accesses access accesses
1. chroot
3 3 3 4
3 4 3 5
2 3 2 5
2. kvm
2 4 3 9
3 5 3 8
3 5 3 8
3. kvm IMA
14 4 3 9
14 4 3 9
15 5 3 9
4. c++ bochs
1 25 1 74
1 24 2 72
1 24 1 73
5. c++ bochs IMA
675 23 15 68
678 23 15 67
677 23 15 67
6. llvm-bochs
1 29 2 90
1 30 2 89
1 29 2 88
7. llvm-bochs IMA
847 28 19 85
840 30 19 82
838 27 19 83
8. llvm-bochs hypervisor
48 31 3 90
47 30 3 95
45 30 3 95
9. llvm-bochs
IMA +
hyper-
visor
904 30 21 91
907 30 20 96
923 31 21 95
Table 2: The table shows the outcomes of three repeated experiments. Execution time in seconds,
including NTP overhead.
small files respectively) when compared to having
checksum in side the kernel (676 and 15 seconds)
when using the bochs hypervisor.
Comparing line 8 with line 6 for the next 99 ac-
cesses where no integrity check is made, we see that
the hypervisor integrity check code adds 6 percent
to the execution time. Comparing line 9 with line
7, we see that the hypervisor integrity check adds
8 percent to the execution time,
From the above we find that the costs for the
llvm-bochs hypervisor integrity check can be at-
tributed in most part to the use of bochs as hyper-
visor, since it incurs a five to seven times execution
overhead over kvm. To that is added a 20 percent
cost due to our use of a modified bochs, llvm-bochs.
On top of that is the 8 percent overhead from the
hypervisor integrity check added to arrive from the
values in the ”next 99 accesses” columns on line 2
to the values on line 8.
The values in ”First access column” in line 8 (47
seconds) is the result of reading and checksumming
the large files. This operation added about 12 sec-
onds to kvm IMA on line 3, making us expect a
value of 90 seconds. We currently do not have a
good explanation for why we see a lower value.
We also see a large dip in performance when run-
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Table 3: Performance results for approach 2; the execution time measured in seconds. The average is
taken over the last five of six runs.
ning IMA inside any of the bochs hypervisors. This
dip was initially thought to be due to bad inter-
action between IMA, bochs and the host OS, but
since the hypervisor on line 8 is also loading the
pages via the guest kernel, it must be a bad inter-
action between IMA and bochs only.
4.2 Approach 2: Hypervisor Ap-
proves Kernel-Computed Check-
sums
The measured execution time for the second ap-
proach provide some insight into where the costs
are. In this approach we run most of the guest code
natively in domU using the Intel VT, and only in-
voke the integrity functions in dom0 when the break
point in ima calc hash is reached.
The two big sources of overhead are the kernel’s
and IMA’s bookkeeping when opening files, and the
actual work in computing the checksum. To esti-
mate these individual costs we chose workloads that
stressed these two sources individually, by having
few or many files, and a small or large file set to
checksum. The execution times can be seen in table
3.
To tease out the individual components, we do a
least-squares fit of the four values for the length of
first execution on each line to
time = k1/1000 ∗#files+ k2 ∗ gigabytes
where k1 is the time (in milliseconds) to handle each
file, and k2 is the time to handle 1 GB of data. This
fit is very coarse, but the results in table 4 show
that IMA adds about 10 seconds per GiB that gets
checksummed.
The bookkeeping cost per file rises from 1-2 ms to
50 ms with IMA, which is particularly costly when
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Hypervisor k1, ms per file k2, s per GiB
bare metal
1.2994 0.41262
IMA 50.965 9.6601
dom0
1.6046 0.34258
IMA 54.203 9.7068
domU
1.8657 0.5719
IMA 4.2216 10.6
breakpoint IMA 43.668 8.7023
HMAC IMA 97.505 8.7085
RSA IMA 118.7 9.5136
Table 4: Least squares fit of the first access to a file to the function time = k1/1000 ∗A+ k2 ∗B where
A is the number of files accessed, 100 or 20000, and B is the total size of the set in GB, 1 or 10.
there are many files that need to be checksummed.
HMAC adds another 50 ms per first file access, and
RSA adds yet another 20 ms to that, reaching al-
most 120 ms per first file access. Subsequent file
accesses do not reach the break point as the file is
marked as already checksummed by the IMA code
in the Linux kernel.
We note that the estimated time per GiB appears
to have decreased for the last three lines in table 4.
This may indicate that the least squares fit to the
data was not very accurate, and some of the cost
due to checksumming was incorrectly attributed to
the triggering of the breakpoint. However, a re-fit
of the data with k2 set to 10.6 seconds does not
significantly change the result, only reducing the
least squares estimated cost per file with 0.5 ms.
Unintuitively, the cost per file is very low for the
DomU with IMA. In table 3 the execution time for
DomU IMA in test 2 is only 86 seconds, compared
to 1034 seconds for bare metal IMA. This cannot
be explained by caching effects, since the DomU
was running on a separate disk device. Further
discussion about this anomaly can be found in [13].
5 Related work
For virtualization, we have used Bochs [12], which
is an emulator written in C++ that can run unmod-
ified kernels on any CPU, and Xen [3], which can
use either modified kernels (paravirtualization), or
take advantage of special virtualization support in
CPUs that have it (HVM). By itself Xen only mon-
itors coarse VM behavior such as what goes in and
out via the virtual devices, memory and CPU uti-
lization rate, not fine details such as file content.
Virtualization has been used to lock down guests
in many ways. Logging and replay techniques were
proposed in [8]. VM introspection for intrusion de-
tection was proposed in [9, 16]. XenAccess [14] en-
able introspection of a Xen VM without being able
to interrupt it, which is why we needed to use gdb-
sx instead for our experiments.
iRODS [20] is a policy based system for control-
ing cloud clients’ access to data in the Amazon S3
file system. iRODS enforces policies at specific en-
forement points in user programs, not for general
files opened by the kernel.
While we are interested in moving IMA-like file
integrity checks into the hypervisor, the work by
Christodorescu et al. [5] use introspection for ver-
ifying the integrity of the kernel to protect against
root kits. SecVisor [18] use hardware support to
achieve the same thing.
Other approaches focus on preventing the kernel
to only load authorized code [16, 11]. That fails to
address the issue with modified config files.
In approach 1 we use machine code to machine
code JIT translation to speed up execution. It was
used early in the Dynamo system [1]. PIN [15]
and DynamoRIO [4] are tools that let a user write
probes that are dynamically injected into an appli-
cation level program, not a full OS.
LLVM [10] is a compiler framework that has an
intermediate code representation that enables pro-
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grammatical modification, optimization and JIT
compilation at runtime. It is used in the Binary
Code Inliner to produce optimized code for each
translated basic block on the fly.
This work is relevant to the area of cloud com-
puting. Good surveys of multi-tenant cloud risks
include [17, 19, 6, 7, 2]. The proposed solution
addresses the situation where one needs efficient
and automatic methods for detecting and stopping
hacked servers from being controlled by intruders.
6 Conclusion
We conclude that it is technically possible to put
file integrity control into the hypervisor, both for
kernels without and with pre-compiled support for
integrity measurement. Both techniques require in-
tercepting the kernel at the right place and access-
ing the guest VM RAM.
While the presented work has not focused on op-
timizing the execution time, we have still inves-
tigated the sources of execution overhead for two
different ways to make a hypervisor enforce file in-
tegrity on guest virtual machines. In the first ap-
proach the hypervisor injected calls into the guest
kernel to load the file when the file was first opened,
and the hypervisor computed the file checksum. In
the second approach, the hypervisor relied on the
kernel to compute the checksum, and only matched
the checksum with the white-list.
The implementation of the first approach used
a modified emulator, which made it easy to in-
tercept the guest at addesses extracted from the
kernel symbol file System.map. The main result
is that the overhead of the injection approach is
about eight percent for a small file set, after the
other sources of overhead have been accounted for.
The use of the emulator was the major source
of overhead, responsible for a five time slowdown
compared to HVM virtualization via KVM. This
overhead may be significantly reduced by changing
virtualization technique. An additional 20 percent
overhead came from the use of a JIT tool chain
to produce the code. This overhead may be re-
moved by using a non-JITed emulator, but the rea-
son to include the JIT in the first place is that it
makes possible emulator optimization such as run-
time optimizing hot traces, though it was not im-
plemented in the current prototype.
The second approach used Xen’s gdb debug fa-
cilities to attach python scripts to monitor a guest
VM. We observed that triggering the break point
costs around 40 ms per triggering, but the num-
ber of triggerings is reduced by guest kernel only
computes the checksum when the file is not in the
file checksum cache. The overhead of the approach
is between 20 percent for a small file set and 100
percent for a large file set.
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